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Since the early 1980s, international studies have sustained a theoretical dynamism. 
The demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative science has forced 
scholars to re-examine the ontological and epistemological foundations of their dis-
cipline.1 After the first great debate that pitted idealism against realism in the 1940s 
and the second debate confronting behaviouralism and traditionalism in the 1950s-
1960s, this so-called “third debate” has lead to an increasing criticism of the domi-
nant realist paradigm in international relations. Foucault’s work unquestionably fu-
els this third inter-paradigm debate and the rise of the post-positivist approach to 
international relations.2
While international relations scholars have been trying for more than twenty 
years to address contemporary changes in world politics by debating the key con-
cepts structuring political science, public international law is obviously stuck within 
a largely unquestioned and outmoded statist approach. A Foucauldian Approach to 
International Law is a noticeable exception to this general assertion. In his book, 
Hammer points out that international law essentially failed to acknowledge the 
emergence of new international actors such as non-governmental international or-
ganisations and sub-national political entities or individuals. Moreover, interna-
tional law has been struggling since its very origins with some inherent ambiguities 
 His concern with historically specific conditions in which 
knowledge is generated allowed poststructuralists to offer an alternative conception 
of international relations. It brought new blood to international relations by ques-
tioning the realist image of the world, especially its state-centrism, its obsession with 
political-military power and its blindness to various sub-national or trans-national 
actors. 
                                                 
1  Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: on the Prospects of International Theory in a Post- 
Positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly, 33, 3, 1989,  235-254. 
2  Pierre Anouilh, Emmanuel Puig, “Les relations internationals à l’épreuve du  
poststructuralisme : Foucault et le troisième ‘grand débat’ épistémologique”, in Sylvain  
Meyet, Marie-Cécile Naves, Thomas Ribémont (eds.), Travailler avec Foucault. Retours sur  
le politique (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004), 141-159. 
Duez: review of Foucauldian Approach to International Law 
 
106 
 
and inconsistencies regarding the link between law and political processes. Accord-
ing to Hammer, the main problem is that, unlike in national jurisdictions, within the 
international system there is no actual legal system. Since the states are creating the 
law for their own regulation, aspects of enforcement are usually lacking. Interna-
tional law has thus been caught between three different discourses: first, the realist 
assertions that international law does not exist as such, but only as a tool of states 
and as a reflection of their particular interests; second, institutionalism that accords 
some role for international law-making organisations; third, cosmopolitan assump-
tions of moral state behaviour with a view towards the identification of an existing 
social order.3
Referring to Foucault as a means of understanding and enhancing interna-
tional law, Hammer tries in the second chapter of the book to move away from the 
traditional dichotomous battle between normative objectivity and consensual under-
standing of international law. He suggests “a transformative understanding of the 
international system and a transgressive approach to one’s perception of interna-
tional society.”
 
4 The underlying assertion is that the “transgressive” Foucauldian 
conception of power can help international legal theory to address the on-going 
changes that have developed within the international system: the growth of interna-
tional and regional organisations, the move towards globalisation and the rise of 
new actors. Since the state is not maintaining full and complete control but rather 
part of a matrix of power, Hammer considers that what begs attention is not the 
state as the central actor in the international system, but “an understanding of the 
variety of actors’ use of techniques and tactics of domination to understand the 
framework and forms of relations.”5
The third chapter considers the manner by which a state might acquire stand-
ing and personality within the international system via international recognition. 
Recognition is at a crossroads between a state according another entity some form of 
 The influence of international law is not solely a 
matter of sovereign command, but is one of resistance among social forces. It is a 
part of the social power system. The law does not serve a regulatory role between 
the state and the individual, but rather functions as part of the process in shaping 
individuals and allowing for their reactions that in turn further serve to shape and 
influence social process. 
Starting from these general assumptions, each chapter of the book addresses 
a fundamental problem within international law, with each chapter following the 
same pattern. After discussing the underlying problems posed by traditional legal 
doctrines regarding the topic of the chapter, Hammer offers an alternative approach 
pursuant to Foucault’s understanding of power and governmentality.  
                                                 
3  Leonard M. Hammer, A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive Thoughts for  
Normative Issues (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007),  8. 
4  Ibid.,  9. 
5  Ibid., 19. 
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legitimacy such as to deem it a state, while also making a statement regarding policy 
and desire. The legal doctrine recognizes that the explanation for this decision is not 
to be found in a specific normative framework but essentially in the will of the state. 
Recognition is always a political decision reflecting interests and treatment accorded 
by one entity to another with little legal fallout. It is linked to the circumstances. By 
introducing the Foucauldian notion of “regime of truth,” Hammer shows that “even 
with the recognition decision being considered within a political context and at the 
mercy of the states, there are still other forms of influence that hold sway over the 
state to the extent of influencing its decision as well as altering the position and 
status of the entity at question.”6 Recognition is an ongoing pattern of changing 
standards for a recognized entity, such that the truth of an entity’s status is subject to 
the regime of understanding as understood by the actors involved in the process. 
This regime of truth within the context of recognition is thus a contingent notion. It 
emanates not only from other states, but also from their relationship with such other 
bodies as international organisations. It reflects an ever-changing conception of the 
criteria for statehood. Therefore, what is important is to understand why an idea is 
understood to be the truth and how that came about.7
The fifth chapter is probably the most original of the book, and potentially the 
most controversial too. It considers international human rights via a reference to the 
right of freedom of religion and belief. The purpose of the author in this chapter is to 
“examine modes by which human rights can maintain some form of social role 
within society in a manner that does not necessarily eviscerate the surrounding cul-
ture, but becomes part of the ongoing social discourse.”
 
The fourth chapter addresses a key source of international law, that being 
customary law. Adhering to the transgressive approach to custom, Hammer pro-
poses to turn one’s attention from the question of identifying the contents of custom 
towards the surrounding events and developments that have led one to declare a 
norm as achieving customary status. Once again, the questions are why and how a 
customary norm has emerged. Reflecting Foucault’s approach to governmentality, 
Hammer’s goal is to rethink rules and aspects of state behaviour by considering how 
the state and other actors envision custom. Customary international law then is not 
considered as a final source of law, but as part of the ongoing discourse that tends to 
influence and affect pattern of relations and actions. This discourse incorporates a 
broad gamut of international and domestic actors, including the individual, non-
governmental organisations, the state and international bodies. 
8
                                                 
6  Ibid., 41. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid., 71-72. 
 According to Hammer, it is 
important to acknowledge the social function of beliefs—especially minority beliefs 
and their manifestations—both in forming avenues of understanding and recognis-
ing the necessity for social development. Starting from Foucault’s approach to 
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power, Hammer interprets human rights as the means by which a state subjugates 
the individual to pre-conceived notions regarding the desired structure of society. 
Rights can serve to entrench the state and create a strict framework of operation at 
the expense of individual development. As a result, autonomy and free-thinking can 
be stymied rather than enhanced by human rights. Incorporating Foucault’s under-
standing of truth, Hammer argues that the actual content of the belief or the poten-
tial contradictions between a belief and other rights are not the key issues. Since 
truth and belief are contingent, one should understand belief as a matter of ongoing 
discourse within society and ever-shifting understanding of truth. As a result, he 
suggests that states and judicial tribunals “must look beyond the temptation to en-
gage in some form of social balancing by considering the broader social interplay 
that is at work.”9
Leonard Hammer’s book is a very good piece of scholarship. It challenges the state-
centric paradigm that dominates international legal theory and questions both the 
  
Somewhat less original in content, the sixth chapter engages the relatively re-
cent notion of human security. Unlike the state-centric approach, the human security 
approach views the individual as a subject of the international legal system and con-
siders the notion of security in a more human-orientated manner. It allows a variety 
of programs and initiatives that meet the needs of populations in distress. In this 
chapter, Hammer evaluates the merits of such a reference to human security within 
the framework of international law. Regarding the work of Michel Foucault, Ham-
mer points out that the focus on the welfare of the populations is, in a broad sense, 
pursuant to Foucault’s notion of bio-politics, which shifts attention away from the 
state as the central figure. He suggests that a transformative approach enlightened 
by Foucault’s conception of power allows for a conceptualization of human security 
in a manner that need not rely upon existing normative systems, but rather allows 
for human security to develop in a descriptive sense, as the needs of the population 
or group shift and sway, depending on necessities and surrounding changes. 
The seventh chapter turns towards the Foucauldian framework as a means of 
addressing the rise of non-governmental organisations within an international legal 
framework. Recognising the problems associated with non-governmental organisa-
tions, especially internal and external accountability issues, Hammer examines the 
conditions necessary for a new approach to international law that incorporates vari-
ous non-state entities as viable actors. His goal is to demonstrate how the global civil 
society process reflects the power/knowledge relationship proposed by Foucault. In 
this perspective, global civil society is not presented as a movement of resistance 
emanating from below, but as a reflection of changes in power relations between ac-
tors, all of whom maintain some form of influence, as well as being subject to influ-
ential drives of the other participating actors. Global civil society is not considered as 
a democratic ideal, but rather as a reflection of emerging forms of governmentality. 
                                                 
9  Ibid., 94-95. 
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realist and cosmopolitan interpretations of international law. Hammer emphasizes 
the ever-changing character of truth and the importance of analyzing the broader 
context within which international norms and practices emerge. Pursuant to Fou-
cault’s “toolbox approach”, Hammer does not intend to propose a new global expla-
nation for the international legal system. He invites us to use the intellectual devices 
offered by Foucault to better explicate international law. Nevertheless, while the 
book is an excellent contribution to the epistemological debate in the field of interna-
tional law, the author nonetheless falls short of offering a satisfactory analysis of any 
of the issues that he has selected for investigation. Therefore, although the book by 
Hammer is a breakthrough in international legal theory, it does not bring any new 
perspectives to political science or Foucauldian studies. The book is a new exam-
ple—a quite good one indeed—of how Foucault’s political thought can usefully be 
re-appropriated in support of renewed analysis of the social power system. 
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